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■
Douglas W. Arner* &  Joseph J. Norton**
I. Introduction
During the week of 15 September 2008, the world faced a global systemic 
financial crisis as the result of the failure of a series of large complex global 
financial institutions (LCGFIs),1 including Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, American International Group (AIG) and Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(HBOS). These failures occurred in the context of legal and regulatory sys-
tems which were unprepared to deal with the consequences of such failures, 
with the result being the current global financial and economic crisis. How-
ever, these were not the first such failures the global financial system and 
domestic regulatory systems have had to face: almost twenty years ago, the 
world experienced the first failure of an LCGFI, the insolvency of the Bank 
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1 For purposes of this article, “LCGFI” refers to a large complex banking organisation (LCBO) or a 
large complex financial institution that has a global presence and / or impact on the financial mar-
kets / systems. Specifically these are larger domestic and foreign banking and / or other financial 
organisations with particularly complex operations and dynamic risk profiles and that require a 
heightened level of planning, coordination and innovative techniques to implement an effective 
supervisory program. These organisations typically have significant on and off-balance-sheet risk 
exposures, offer a broad range of products and services at the domestic and international levels, are 
subject to multiple supervisors domestically and abroad, and participate extensively in or otherwise 
can impact large-value payment and settlement systems and the financial system generally. Cf US 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Supervisory Letter SR 99–15 (SUP) on risk-focused supervi-
sion of large, complex banking organisations, 23 Jun 1999.  
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of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).2 While previous major 
international financial regulatory efforts to address issues such as payment 
systems and capital adequacy were triggered by other crises,3 the cross-bor-
der liquidation of BCCI presented a broad range of significant, previously 
unaddressed issues respecting the insolvency of a multinational banking 
organisation. Though the BCCI debacle was not a collapse of systemic 
significance, it did result in major domestic regulatory reforms respect-
ing cross-border supervision (including in the United Kingdom and Hong 
Kong) as well as serious international efforts to both prevent the failure of 
LCGFIs (especially banks) and begin a regulatory and policy conversation 
that continues today respecting how to develop systems, mechanisms and 
procedures to address such failures which might occur in an orderly and ef-
fective manner.4 
The insolvency of BCCI also provided major impetus for the work of a ris-
ing academic at the University of Hong Kong (HKU), Philip St. John Smart, 
to publish the first serious book addressing international insolvency. Since its 
2 BCCI was an international private bank founded in Karachi by a leading Pakistani financier in 
1972. The institution, which came to operate through a holding company structure, was chartered 
in Luxembourg, though it maintained its treasury functions in the Cayman Islands and its key op-
erational base in London before consolidating its operations in Abu Dhabi in 1990. At its height 
in the late 1980s, it had branches and subsidiaries in over 70 countries and held assets exceeding 
US$20 billion (making it, at the time, the seventh largest private bank in the world). Because 
of its complex structure, BCCI operated largely on a non-transparent basis, with no single bank 
regulator or audit firm having a full view and control over the entire enterprise. Due to large-scale 
fraud and corrupt and criminal practices at the core of the enterprise, the UK and US regulators, in 
conjunction with the Luxembourg and Cayman Island authorities, closed BCCI in 1991 and forced 
it into liquidation. For further discussion see Lord Justice Bingham, Inquiry into the supervision of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (London: HMSO, Oct 1992); J. Kerry & H. Brown, “The 
BCCI Affair: A Report  to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (Dec 1992, 
102d Congress 2d Session Senate Print 102–140). Also, for implications of the BCCI scandal, see, 
inter alia, Joseph J. Norton, “Projecting Trends in International Bank Supervision: After BCCI,” 
J. Norton (ed), International Finance in the 1990s: Challenges and Opportunities (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), Ch 4.
3 Eg the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in the early 1970s  and the near failure of a number of  large 
international banks in the wake of the developing country debt crisis of the early 1980s. See inter 
alia, R. Dale, The Regulation of International Banking (1984).
4 According to one of the leading analyses:
  BCCI revealed some of the complications that could arise in the insolvency of a multinational 
banking organisation. Lack of agreement on an international insolvency regime means that 
conflicts may arise with regard to the treatment of deposits and assets at branches in different 
countries, with regard to what entity will act as liquidator and what objectives that liquidator 
will pursue, and with regard to the right of set-off, if any. Moreover, criminal prosecution in the 
United States may preempt these normal, if chaotic, bankruptcy procedures. In view of these 
complications, it is not surprising that the uninsured creditors of BCCI have incurred substantial 
legal expenses and been obliged to wait a very long time for the settlement of their claims.
 R. Herring, “BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global Corporate 
Structure,” (2005) Wharton Financial Institution Center Working Paper Series, No. 05-18. See 
also, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Insolvency Liquidation of a Multinational 
Bank (Dec 1992) for a detailed discussion of the BCCI liquidation and the enormous complexities 
posed due to a lack of an effective and orderly insolvency framework for the liquidation of just an 
entity. See also the incipient reform efforts of the Basel Committee, Minimum Standards for the 
supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border establishments (Jul 1992).
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publication in 1991, Philip’s Cross-Border Insolvency has come to be regarded 
as the single most influential book in this area and has been cited by the high-
est courts of the Common Law world, including the UK’s House of Lords and 
Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal.5 At the time of his sudden and untimely 
death in 2008, Philip was working on the third edition, and it is certain that 
the current global financial crisis would have provided a great deal for Philip 
to deal with – and for us to discuss with him.
We present this article as a memorial tribute to our friend, colleague and 
counsellor. Before coming to HKU in the late 1990s, we were already famil-
iar with Philip’s work: Philip was even then regarded in British academic 
circles as one of the intellectual “pathfinders” in the international insolven-
cy arena. When we visited HKU in 1998, Philip was among the first people 
we met and became one of our firmest friends, to our substantial academic 
and personal betterment. While, for his own reasons, Philip chose to limit 
his travels, his reputation was truly world-wide: scholars, judges and prac-
titioners from all over the common law world sought him out. Philip was a 
first-class legal scholar with a wide international reputation: he was highly 
instrumental in the HKU Faculty of Law establishing its own international 
institutional reputation. With no fanfare, Philip (as collaborator, adviser 
and colleague) invariably made his colleagues better scholars and individu-
als, and his Faculty an intellectually and collegially better environment.
Philip himself was an internationalist; but, at his core, he was a great 
believer in the vitality, adaptability, robustness and efficacy of the common 
law. Though Philip initially looked with some legitimate curiosity as to why 
certain jurisdictions had devised particularised insolvency laws for bank-
ing institutions, he also appreciated the enormous legal complexities of the 
matter – particularly since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.6 We 
gained much from Philip’s input and insights into our own academic work.
In approaching this tribute article to Philip, we wish to raise further 
complex insolvency issues arising from the current global financial crisis.7 
In so doing, we feel rather incomplete in not being able to discuss evolving 
ideas with Philip. We reluctantly understand that all must eventually come 
to pass. But, Philip’s life ended all too soon and abruptly. In the time we 
5 See P. Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency (London: Butterworths, 1991, 2nd edn, 1997).
6 See P. Smart, “Insolvency Law Reform: International Financial Insolvencies”, in S. Goo, D. Arner 
& Z. Zhou, International Financial Sector Reform: Standard Setting and Infrastructure Development 
(London: Kluwer, 2002), Ch 8.
7 On the global financial crisis and its regulatory implications, see, inter alia, Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience (Apr 2008); FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and 
Institutional Resilience: Follow-up on Implementation (Oct 2008); FSF, Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience: Update on Implementation (Apr 
2009); D. Arner, “The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes, Consequences and Implications for 
Financial Regulation,” (2009) 43 Int’l Lawyer (forthcoming).
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had Philip with us, Philip gave us much. For this, we feel blessed, and, for 
which, Philip’s memory will remain always with us.
Specifically, this article considers the possible design of frameworks to 
address failures of LCGFIs, at the domestic, regional and international lev-
els. Following this introduction, in section II, the article considers briefly 
the problems that have been presented by the recent failures or near fail-
ures of such institutions, including institutions which have been judged 
too large and complex to fail (eg AIG and Citigroup) and others which 
have been allowed to fail (eg Lehman Brothers).8 From this basis, in sec-
tion III, the article discusses possible mechanisms to prevent the failure of 
LCGFIs and thereby prevent such failures causing systemic financial crises 
of the sort experienced in September and October 2008.9 At the same 
time, in market-based financial systems, failures will occur and one of the 
most significant lessons to emerge from the global financial crisis so far is 
that  LCGFIs can and do fail; without a framework developed in advance 
to address such failures in an orderly and effective manner when they occur, 
systemic risk increases. Section IV thus considers possible mechanisms to 
address the failure of such institutions. Finally, section V concludes, focus-
ing on recent international discussions of related issues emanating from the 
Group of Twenty (G20) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).
II. The Global Financial Crisis and Failures of Large Complex Global 
Financial Institutions (LGCFIs)
Weak financial intermediaries and problems with financial regulation and 
supervision have been significant factors in many financial crises, including 
the problems surrounding the developing country debt crisis and the US 
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s,10 the collapses of BCCI and Barings,11 
the Mexican and Asian financial crises in the 1990s,12 and the current 
global financial crisis.13 Prior to the current financial crisis, these various 
problems have led to a wide range of international efforts directed towards 
8 See, eg, B. Bernanke, “Current Economic and Financial Conditions”, Speech at the National As-
sociation for Business Economics 50th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 7 Oct 2008 (wherein he 
discusses issues surrounding Lehman and AIG).
9 Cf President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Progress Update on March Policy Statement 
on Financial Market Developments (Oct 2008).
10 See, inter alia, G. Olson, Banks in Distress: Lessons from the American Experience of the 1980s (London: 
Kluwer, 2000).
11 See Herring, n 4 above.
12 See D. Arner, M. Yokoi-Arai & Z. Zhou, Financial Crises in the 1990s (London: British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2001).
13 See n 7 above.
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supporting financial stability.14 Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the cur-
rent financial crisis, these efforts, while important, have not been sufficient 
to prevent the current global financial turmoil. Nonetheless, the starting 
point in addressing the failure of global financial conglomerates is the exist-
ing arrangements designed to prevent such situations from developing, most 
particularly prudential regulation and supervision.
This article focuses on two aspects that have been of most significance 
during the current global financial crisis: the failure (including actual in-
solvency) of global financial conglomerates such as Lehman Brothers (the 
first insolvency of a LCGFI since BCCI, this time an investment bank with 
a global presence), AIG (a global insurance organisation) and Citigroup (a 
global universal banking group).15 Such failures have the potential (as evi-
denced by the insolvency of Lehman Brothers) to trigger systemic financial 
crises, as occurred in September 2008. In looking to related issues, the first 
is the question of preventing failures of systemically important financial 
conglomerates. The second (assuming that such failures will be allowed to 
occur in future, at least in some jurisdictions) is the question of what would 
be effective  and orderly mechanisms to resolve such failures when they do 
occur in future.
In the current crisis, recent LCGFI failures have been expressed by in-
solvency (most dramatically in the case of Lehman Brothers); in others, 
failing institutions have been taken over by stronger or seemingly stronger 
institutions (for example, JP Morgan and Bear Stearns, Bank of America 
and Merrill Lynch, Lloyds and HBOS);16 in yet others, by government 
intervention and support (in the cases of AIG, Citigroup, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and UBS, among others), up to and including partial or complete 
nationalisation.17
The systemic phase of the current global financial crisis was triggered 
by the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, a major global investment bank, 
in September 2008. This insolvency is now the world’s largest and most 
14 See D. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007); R. Weber & D. Arner, “Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation”, 29 U. 
Pennsylvania J. Int’l L. 391 (2008).
15 In addition to these failures, the current crisis has also  included the collapse of the US automobile 
industry, the insolvencies of a growing number of large and small business firms with cross-border 
operations around the world, and a growing number of sovereign financial crises (with Iceland 
likely to be only the first, and with imminent distressed sovereign situations in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Latin America).
16 As of March 2009, the financial health of both Bank of America (following its takeover of Merrill 
Lynch) and Lloyds has come into serious doubt, with the once healthy and conservative Lloyds 
now majority owned by the UK Government and Bank of America requiring significant financial 
assistance from the US government.
17 Cf Financial Times, “In Depth, Global Financial Crisis: Global banking reshaped”, available at 
http://www.ft.com/indepth/global-financial-crisis (visited 15 Apr 2009).
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complex.18 At the same time, however, other major institutions were not 
allowed to fail, because authorities determined that they were simply too 
large, complex and globally connected for the global financial system to be 
able to deal with actual insolvency. The best example of the latter is AIG 
– prior to the crisis, the world’s largest insurance company, with operations 
in over 100 countries around the world, over US$ one trillion in assets and 
regulated by literally hundreds of regulars globally.19
While AIG was judged as too complex and interconnected to be al-
lowed to fail (ie, systemically significant) and thus has received serial US 
government support amounting to over US$150 billion to date, Lehman 
Brothers was judged to be a non-systemically significant institution and 
therefore subject to insolvency.20 As noted above,  in retrospect, the in-
solvency of Lehman Brothers was the trigger for the systemic phase of the 
global financial crisis. As such, the insolvency of Lehman Brothers high-
lights the very real problems which can arise as the result of the failure of 
an LCGFI and the failure of international and domestic mechanisms to 
address such failures.
Preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of 
financial regulatory design. Such a design requires the following elements 
to be addressed: first, a robust financial infrastructure (especially payment 
and settlement systems); second, well-managed financial institutions with 
effective corporate governance and risk management systems; third, disclo-
sure requirements sufficient to support market discipline; fourth, regulatory 
systems designed to reinforce management and market discipline as well as 
18 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LBHI) filed a petition in the US Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of New York under Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code on 18 Sep 2008. The 
petition listed consolidated bank and bond debt of more than US$600 billion. The filing marked 
the first failure of a major investment bank since the demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert in Feb 
1990. Lehman’s problems originated from large-scale losses and write-downs taken on exposures 
to troubled assets and concerns that future losses would outstrip the company’s previous efforts to 
replenish its capital base. As such, its failure revived questions about investment banks’ highly lev-
eraged balance sheets and associated dependence on wholesale funding that had been raised when 
Bear Stearns had nearly failed in early 2008. Thus, when confidence in the continued viability of 
the company collapsed, its access to wholesale markets was cut off, forcing Lehman into bankrupt-
cy. See Bank for International Settlement (BIS), BIS Quarterly Review (Dec 2008). A subsequent 
insolvency administration proceeding was filed in the United Kingdom. See http://www.lehman.
com/(visited 15 Apr 2009), which site directs one to the relevant update links on the US and UK 
proceedings and concerning other global aspects of Lehman unwinding. Related proceedings have 
been initiated in Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, Germany and Singapore, among others.
19 On the AIG collapse, which US Senator Richard Shelby has referred to as the “greatest corporate 
failure in US history,” see Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearing: 
American International Group: Examining what went wrong, government intervention, and 
implications for future regulation (5 Mar 2009). The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve in his 
testimony indicted his biggest disappointment in the global financial crisis to date was having to 
rescue AIG, which he said operated a “large hedge fund” through a largely unsupervised parent 
holding company of what was otherwise a solvent and solid group of insurance subsidiaries. 
20 See B. Bernanke, “US Financial Markets”, Testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 23 Sept 2008.
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limiting and monitoring potential risks across all financial institutions; fifth, 
a liquidity provider of last resort to provide liquidity to financial institutions 
on an appropriate basis; sixth, mechanisms for resolving problem financial 
institutions (and not simply commercial banking institutions); and seventh, 
mechanisms to protect financial services consumers in the event of finan-
cial institution failure.21
The following section focuses on the fourth element (which interacts 
closely with the remaining six), namely prudential regulation and supervi-
sion. Section IV discusses the fifth (liquidity provision), sixth (resolution) 
and seventh (customer protection mechanisms) elements in greater detail.
III. Preventing the Failure of Financial Conglomerates
In addressing the question of building frameworks to address the failure of 
global financial conglomerates,22 the first level is clearly the prevention of 
such failures to the extent possible. In this respect, in addressing the global 
financial crisis and co-ordinating responses, the G2023 and the FSF24 have 
emerged as the most significant organisations to date. 
In November 2008, the G20 highlighted the necessity of addressing the 
regulation of complex financial institutions both domestically and glob-
ally. Specifically, on 15 November 2008, following two days of meetings 
in Washington DC, the heads of government and finance ministers of the 
21 See generally Arner, n 14 above. For an alternate view of systemic risk, see S. Schwarcz, “Systemic 
Risk,” (2008) 97 Georgetown L. J. 193.
22 The Tripartite Group (now reconstitute as the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates and 
discussed further below) distinguishes between “financial conglomerates” whose interests are ex-
clusively, or predominantly, in financial activities and “mixed conglomerates”,  those which are 
predominantly commercially or industrially oriented, but contain at least one regulated financial 
entity in some part of their corporate structure. The focus of this article is on the failure of finan-
cial conglomerates. There can be significantly diverse views as to what constitutes a financial 
conglomerate. These views can depend on custom and practice in different countries, and in vari-
ous jurisdictions can be determined under statutes and regulations. For example, in the United 
States, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 2009 and implementing Federal Reserve Board regulations 
contain complex rules for “financial holding companies”. In the European Union, the approach 
is based on universal banking, see Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 Dec 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance un-
dertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/
EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. For further consideration, see G. 
Walker, “The Law of Financial Conglomerates – The Next Generation”, (1996) 30 Int’l Lawyer 57.
23 See www.g20.org (visited 15 Apr 2009).
24 See www.fsforum.org (visited 15 Apr 2009).
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G2025 released their Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the 
World Economy.26 In this Declaration, the G20 discussed the causes of the 
crisis and committed to supporting an open global economy and defined a 
range of actions to be taken (under the supervision of G20 finance minis-
ters) to reform financial regulation to avoid future crises. The G20 heads of 
government established five main principles to guide reforms: (1) strength-
ening transparency and accountability; (2) enhancing sound regulation; (3) 
promoting integrity in financial markets; (4) reinforcing international co-
operation; and (5) reforming the financial architecture.27 For each of these 
five principles, the leaders established a detailed action plan,28 incorporat-
ing immediate actions (to be taken by 31 March 2009) and medium-term 
actions, pending a second G20 heads of government summit in London in 
April 2009. The detailed action plan establishes the core content of the 
refinements to international financial regulatory standards to take place. 
In addition, the leaders tasked finance ministers to give highest priority to 
six areas: (1) mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy; (2) re-
viewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex 
securities; (3) strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit de-
rivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, including by improving 
the infrastructure of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets; (4) reviewing 
compensation practices as they relate to incentives for risk taking and in-
novation; (5) reviewing the international financial architecture; and (6) 
defining the scope of systemically important financial institutions and de-
termining their appropriate regulation and oversight.29
Under the second principle, the G20 committed to: (1) strengthening 
financial regulatory regimes, prudential oversight and risk management; 
25 The G20, formed in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, comprises normally the finance 
ministers and central bank governors of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the heads of the European Union, European 
Central Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The Nov 2008 meeting was the first 
time in which the G20 had met as a forum for heads of government. In addition, the United Na-
tions Secretary General and the FSF chairman were invited to attend the Nov 2008 meeting. On 
discussion of the structure and operation of the G20, see, inter alia, P. Hajnal, The G8 System and 
the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
26 G20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 15 Nov 2008, avail-
able at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf (“G20 Declaration”) 
(visited 15 Apr 2009). Certain aspects, especially those relating to the global economy and the 
international financial architecture, build upon the G20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors communiqué from the previous week: G20, Communiqué: Meeting of Ministers 
and Governors, Sao Paolo, Brazil, 8-9 Nov 2008, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
2008_communique_saopaulo_brazil.pdf (visited 15 Apr 2009)    
27 G20 Declaration, p 3.
28 G20, Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform, 15 Nov 2008, available at http://www.g20.
org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf (visited 6th May 2009) (“G20 Action Plan”). 
29 G20 Declaration, p 4.
09_Essays.indd   102 5/16/09   9:41:26 AM
Vol 39 Part 1 Building a Framework to Address Failure of Complex Global Financial Institutions 103
and (2) ensuring that “all financial markets, products and participants are 
regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances”.30 
In particular, the G20 highlighted for attention (1) credit rating agencies, 
(2) making regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle 
while “ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle innovation, 
and encourages expanded trade in financial products and services”, and 
(3) a new commitment to transparent assessments of national regulatory 
systems.31 The Action Plan addresses three areas: (1) regulatory regimes; (2) 
prudential oversight; and (3) risk management. We will return to each of 
these below.
A. Yes or No?
In addressing such issues, there are two fundamental questions which any 
system must address: (1) will there be failures of major financial institu-
tions?; and (2) will financial conglomerates be allowed to exist? These 
questions need to be addressed at the domestic and international and in 
some cases regional levels. 
In relation to the first, in the context of the global financial crisis fol-
lowing the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, governments around the world 
have generally taken the decision that, at least during the crisis, other major 
financial institutions will not be allowed to fail. At the same time, however, 
the crisis will not last forever, though it could be prolonged (as was that of 
Japan in the 1990s);32 and at some point, markets and economies will return 
to a “new normal”.33 In that emerging environment, governments will need 
to re-evaluate their policies on whether major financial institutions will be 
allowed to fail. 
Clearly, some jurisdictions will take the decision that certain major 
financial institutions will not be allowed to fail. In those jurisdictions, 
the requirements of regulation must of necessity be very high in order to 
both make sure that failure does not occur and at the same time provide 
appropriate incentives for major financial institutions to operate as 
efficiently as possible albeit without the ultimate risk of failure. Moreover, 
even if technically in these jurisdictions, major financial institutions will 
30 G20 Declaration. p 3.
31 Ibid.
32 See eg M. Shirakawa, “Speech: Coping with financial crisis – Japan’s experiences and current global 
financial crisis”, Tokyo, 25 Feb 2009; H. Nakaso, “The financial crisis in Japan during the 1990s: 
how the Bank of Japan responded and the lessons learnt”, (2001) BIS Papers No 6. 
33 There undoubtedly will be ongoing discussions and debates over the next several years as to what 
a “new normal” will comprise for the world economy and international financial system and for 
individual domestic economies and financial systems (both developed and developing economies). 
In the context of the United States, for an interesting discussion, see R. Florida , “How the Crash 
Will Reshape America”, Atlantic (Mar 2009).
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not be subject to insolvency, such institutions may still find themselves in 
financial distress, with their respective governments (and taxpayers) being 
responsible for their resolution and restructuring.34 At the same time, it 
seems likely that many jurisdictions will return to market principles (ie to 
market discipline and related moral hazard notions) as the basis for their 
financial systems following the crisis; and, in those jurisdictions, financial 
institutions (as with any private firm) will be allowed to fail and in fact 
most likely will do so periodically. In this latter scenario, regulation remains 
very important in reducing the frequency and severity of such failures 
and at the same time in providing appropriate incentives to stakeholders 
to maximise efficiency and minimise systemic risk.35 However, one needs 
to keep in mind that over the past two decades, significant efforts have 
been made internationally and within major jurisdictions (including the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union) to upgrade 
prudential standards for financial institutions; yet these were not sufficient 
to prevent the systemic crisis in autumn 2008.36
Related to the issue of quality prudential regulation are the availability 
of an effective “early warning system” (EWS) and the availability of prompt 
corrective action (PCA). EWSs are economic variables, financial ratios and 
accounting measures that predict financial distress, panics or financial crisis 
situations. They are devised to detect financial distress at an early stage and 
to assist its resolution in a timely manner in order to prevent a loss of con-
fidence in the financial system. For the regulator to be proactive in respect 
of financial crises, early detection of a financial crisis is essential. EWS can 
be divided into those that detect individual bank problems and those that 
are aimed at problems widely seen in the financial system (financial system 
wide problems). Because causes of a financial crisis are multiple and diverse, 
various signals indicate an impending financial crisis. A financial crisis sur-
faces from various routes, depending on the group of people affected or to 
whom information on financial distress is available. Regulators need to refer 
to a broad spectrum of EWSs to detect signs of a nearing financial crisis.37
However, the method of using an EWS in policy formulation is difficult. 
Some EWSs can be applied objectively but do not monitor the overall finan-
cial sector. Some EWSs do not provide a clear signal on whether a financial 
crisis is nearing or not. Some EWSs require historical considerations to 
34 For example, in the case of China during the 1990s, see J. Norton, C. Li & Y. Huang (eds), Finan-
cial Law in the Chinese Economic Circle: Risk and Regulation (London: Kluwer, 2000); B. Hsu, D. 
Arner & Q. Wan, “Policy Functions as Law: Legislative Forbearance in China’s Asset Management 
Companies”, (2007) 23 UCLA Pacific Basin L. J. 129.
35 See, inter alia, Arner, n 14 above particularly Parts II & III.
36 See generally Ibid.
37 See, inter alia, J. Norton & M. Yokoi-Arai, “Discerning Future Financial Crises: The Institutional 
Based Dimensions”, (2001) 24 Bank of Valletta Rev 1.
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identify the signals. There is no foolproof EWS, but systematically combin-
ing them could effect a timely regulatory action to preserve a safe and sound 
financial system. Possibly, in addition to global and domestic EWSs, regional 
EWSs could be beneficial (eg, Europe, Asia and Latin America). 
A financial institution-specific (or micro-prudential) EWS is conducted 
by on-site examination and off-site examination of financial institutions, 
examining the business and the performance of each individual institution, 
with the aim of evaluating the financial condition of each individual insti-
tution and not the financial system as a whole. When the regulator detects 
a problem in a financial institution through the institution-specific EWS, 
it will take regulatory action against that institution. While bank-specific 
EWSs identify problems of each individual financial institution, the finan-
cial system (or macro-prudential) EWS endeavours to detect the fragility of 
the overall financial system, to which much greater attention is now being 
directed as a result of the current global financial crisis.
Irrespective of the actual EWS model used, the efficacy of these is sur-
rounded by a number of problems. First, there is the issue of completeness, 
source and quality of the information and data utilised. Second, there is 
the question of analysis and interpretation and by whom. Third, there is 
the policy and implementation response and by whom. Certainly, an effec-
tive EWS cannot be implemented in isolation, but should entail a regional 
and international dimension: at the end of the day, the policy-makers and 
implementers will be at the domestic level.38                                                                             
Regulatory action against financial crises, nationally and internationally, 
also should increasingly focus on the use of prompt corrective action (PCA), 
both at the micro-prudential and macro-prudential levels. If a regulator has 
an effective PCA mechanism, it will be able to intervene in a preventive, 
prompt manner when a financial institution or the financial system begins 
to show signs of fragility and prior to actual insolvency. In addition, if such 
preventive intervention is not successful, the regulator then needs to be 
able to act promptly and orderly in closing and liquidating failed institu-
tion.39 Again, while most regulators would agree in principle as to the need 
for PCA, the actual structuring and implementation of such a programme 
remains fragmented among domestic regulators.40
38 Ibid.
39 An example of a comprehensive PCA mechanism is that employed by US bank regulators pursuant 
to the 1991 FDICIA legislation, see, inter alia, R. Carnell et al., The Law of Banking and Financial 
Institutions (Wolters Kluwer, 2009, 4th ed), Ch 5; J. Norton (co-author), “The Foreign Bank Super-
vision Act of 1991: Expanding the Umbrella of ‘Supervisory Reregulation” (1992) 26 Int’l Lawyer 4.
40 See G. Kaufman (ed), Prompt Corrective Action in Banking: 10 Years Later (Research in Financial 
Services: Private & Public Policy, 2002).
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In relation to the second question raised at the beginning of this sec-
tion, some jurisdictions will continue to allow financial conglomerates 
or “universal” financial institutions to exist, while others will not. It now 
seems likely that a range of jurisdictions may return to traditional sectoral 
regulatory and financial institution structures, thus prohibiting the exis-
tence of cross-sectoral activities and affiliations as to commercial banking 
and securities activities, as was done in the United States as a result of the 
Great Depression legislation of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Banking Act41 until 
its effective repeal in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) that 
permitted “financial holding companies” instead of the more limited bank 
holding companies and that allowed banks to have “financial subsidiaries” 
in addition to more limited operating subsidiaries.42 At the same time, the 
authors are of the view that it does not appear that the United States will 
repeal the GLBA, but instead will seek to legislatively and/or regulatorily 
restrict and to provide more extensive oversight.43 Along similar lines, the 
European Union appears to remain committed to universal banking (at 
least in some risk-focussed modified form and as overseen by the European 
Commission) and thus the existence of financial conglomerates.44 Yet other 
jurisdictions most likely will remain cautious about permitting banks to 
engage in cross-sectoral activities. In sum, domestic (and in some cases re-
gional) decisions regarding limitations on the existence and/or structure of 
financial conglomerates should guide decisions regarding regulatory struc-
ture in individual jurisdictions.
Regardless of individual national and/or regional decisions regarding 
the potential for failure of major financial institutions and the existence or 
structure of financial conglomerates, it is unlikely that agreement will be 
reached at an international level regarding these issues.45 As such, interna-
tional financial conglomerates will continue to exist and will be subject to 
failure, even if the regulatory and oversight framework is enhanced. As a 
result, there is a clear necessity to build upon existing international pruden-
41 For discussion the Glass-Steagall barrier, see, inter alia, J. Norton, “Up Against ‘The Wall’: Glass-
Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated (‘Reregulated’) Banking Environment”, (1987) 42 
Business Lawyer 327. 
42 See, inter alia, Ibid.
43 For arguments in favour of a return to a sectoral financial system in the United States, see Group of 
30, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability (Group of 30, Jan. 2009)
44 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report (Feb 2009); Financial Services 
Authority (UK), “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis”, Discussion Paper 09/02 (Mar 
2009). Cf R. Smith & I. Walter, “After the Wreckage: What’s Next for Universal Banking?”, RGE 
Monitor, 22 Oct 2008.
45 According to the G20: “Large complex financial institutions will continue to operate in multiple 
jurisdictions in order to meet the needs of their large global clients, and supervision will need to 
be better coordinated internationally with a robust global resolution framework.” G20 Working 
Group 1, n 97 below, pp v-vi.
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tial arrangements to reduce the frequency and impact of such failures and to 
allow them to occur without triggering a systemic financial crisis. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that Henry Paulson, former US 
Treasury Secretary, has indicated that in dealing with failing investment 
banks such as Lehman Brothers, perhaps the greatest difficulty he faced 
was the lack of an effective resolution framework equivalent to that which 
exists for commercial banks .46 Had a similar system existed, it might have 
been possible to resolve Lehman Brothers in an orderly manner and with-
out the resulting systemic financial crisis which took place as the result of 
its disorderly failure.
B. Domestic Structures and Systems
As a general matter, countries around the world have adopted four primary 
structures for addressing cross-sectoral financial intermediary activities and 
financial conglomerates: (1) universal banking, (2) strict sectoral separa-
tion, (3) financial holding companies or (4) parent  / subsidiary structure.47 
Under the universal banking structure, financial intermediaries are allowed 
to conduct any sort of financial activity without any need for separately 
capitalised and/or regulated subsidiaries. Under the strict sectoral separation 
model, financial intermediaries are only allowed to undertake financial ac-
tivities within the sector in which they are authorised: banks and banking, 
insurance, and so on. Cross-sectoral activities are not permitted. Under a 
financial holding company model, an umbrella company – a financial hold-
ing company – may be established which, in turn, may own as subsidiaries 
one or more banks and other financial intermediaries which undertake ac-
tivities within individual financial sectors. The financial holding company 
is a separate company from the individual subsidiaries and does not nor-
mally undertake financial activities directly. Under the parent / subsidiary 
model, a parent financial intermediary (for example, a bank or an insurance 
company) may establish separate subsidiaries to undertake financial activi-
ties in other sectors.  
At this time, there is no general consensus concerning which model is 
the best. Likewise, there is a direct relationship between the model chosen 
for financial intermediaries and financial conglomerates and a given coun-
try’s financial regulatory structure.
46 See “Paulson, Bair Want System for Investment Bank Closure”, Bloomberg, 19 Jun 2008, available 
at  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aKo5giy3WnlM&refer=news (vis-
ited 15 Apr 2009).
47 See Arner, n 14 above; see also D. Arner & J. Lin (eds), Financial Regulation: A Guide to Structural 
Reform (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003).
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In addition to cross-sectoral financial activities and intermediary struc-
ture, a second question arises as to whether financial intermediaries should 
be permitted to undertake nonfinancial business.48 For example:
•  Should banks be allowed to undertake nonfinancial business other 
than banking business? Should universal banks be allowed to under-
take nonfinancial business as well as financial business?
•  Should financial holding companies be allowed to have nonfinan-
cial subsidiaries as well as financial intermediary subsidiaries?
• Should holding companies be allowed to own financial holding 
companies as well as other nonfinancial business?
At present, there is no general international consensus concerning whether 
or not financial intermediaries and financial holding companies should be 
restricted to financial business. At the same time, there is no general con-
sensus regarding whether nonfinancial companies should be able to own 
financial intermediaries or financial holding companies. The main consider-
ations that arise in this context are therefore a country’s regulatory structure 
and supervisory capacity, as well as the level of sophistication within its 
financial sector.
Around the world, in recent years, there has been a growing concern 
about financial regulatory structure in individual economies and espe-
cially about the appropriateness of existing arrangements in the face of 
globalisation, the development of financial conglomerates and the blur-
ring of lines among traditional financial sectors (banking, insurance and 
securities) and products.49
48 Under the US GLBA and related Federal Reserve regulations, there is a hybrid concept of permit-
ted activities referred to as activities “complimentary” to permitted financial activities.
49 See Arner, n 14 above; Arner & Lin, n 47 above.
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Overall, a number of lessons have emerged.50 First, countries need to ex-
amine carefully the advantages and disadvantages of any possible change, 
including the risks inherent in the change process itself. Second, a number 
of basic models or structures are possible: the traditional sectoral model 
(with separate regulators for each financial sector, namely banking, securities 
and insurance, often combined with strict separation or holding company 
structures for financial conglomerates); the functional model (with separate 
regulators for each regulatory function – for example, financial stability, 
prudential, market conduct and competition regulation – catering to finan-
cial conglomerates and product innovation); the institutional model (with 
separate regulators for each type of financial institution, with banks being 
the most common example); and the integrated structure (with one or more 
sectors and/or functions combined in a single agency, often combined with a 
universal banking model for financial services provision). It cannot be taken 
for granted that one model is, per se, better than any other; it depends very 
much on the particular circumstances of the country concerned. The third 
key lesson is that there is an important relationship among regulatory struc-
ture (and attendant financial and human resources), financial structure (the 
relative importance of banking, insurance and capital markets and the level 
of financial development or repression) and the structure of financial institu-
tions (eg strict separation of financial sectors versus universal banking).
A number of conclusions may be suggested. First, financial regulatory 
structure is an important issue. However, the first order of consideration 
must be to develop the underlying infrastructure (legal and otherwise) nec-
essary to support the development of finance and to develop regulatory and 
supervisory capacity in line with international standards and within a sys-
tem of clear objectives, independence and accountability. 
50 For a detailed discussion of major models and their implementation in various jurisdictions, see 
Arner & Lin, n 47 above. This analytical division is generally used outside the United States and 
by the IMF. For an alternative framework of analysis (adopted in the United States), see Group of 
30, The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (Group 
of 30, Oct 2008). Under the G30 / US framework, there are also four models: (1) functional; (2) 
institutional; (3) twin peaks; and (4) integrated. Under this framework, the “functional” model is 
largely equivalent to the more generally used “sectoral” model. The “institutional” model is largely 
equivalent to the more generally used “institutional” model. The “integrated” and “twin peaks” 
model (discussed further below) are equivalent in both the US / G30 and international / IMF 
formulations. The G30 / US framework does not have an equivalent to the international / IMF 
“functional” approach. To further complicate matters, in its recent review of regulatory reform op-
tions, the US Treasury suggested there are four main options: (1) institutionally based functional 
regulation (the current US model); (2) activities based functional regulation (a model based on 
regulators assigned specific functions within the financial system); (3) consolidated regulation (the 
model in the United Kingdom); and (4) objectives based regulation (the model in Australia). US 
Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernised Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008) 
(“US Treasury Blueprint”), pp 138–42. As a result, terminology and understanding the definition 
of that terminology being used in of significant importance in this context.
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With all this in mind, a second conclusion can be drawn that regula-
tory structure should be designed to coincide with an economy’s financial 
structure. There should be full coverage of the intermediaries (especially 
financial conglomerates), functions and risks inherent in a given financial 
system and done in a manner that coincides with the history, culture and 
legal system of that economy. An additional risk involves financial structure 
and regulatory design (“financial and regulatory mismatch”). In this respect, 
the risk is that a jurisdiction’s financial regulatory structure will not equate 
with the structure of its financial sector, that is, financial intermediaries will 
be organised on a basis which is not appropriately addressed by the regula-
tory structure. In such circumstances, it is possible that significant risks may 
develop through financial intermediary operations which are not supervised 
by the existing structure. For example, in a strict separation financial sys-
tem, informal financial groups may develop, which in turn are not regulated 
on a group basis, but only on a sectoral institutional basis, leaving the finan-
cial system exposed to the risks of the “group”.51
Further, coordination and cooperation are essential among all of the 
various authorities responsible for financial regulation in any economy. 
The final conclusion is that the restructuring process itself carries risks and 
should be carefully considered and conducted in order to avoid worsening 
the existing situation.
Once again, overall, there is no general consensus as to which model is 
superior at present. The fundamental issue is tailoring a country’s financial 
regulatory structure to its own circumstances and especially its structure for 
addressing financial intermediary activities and financial conglomerates, 
but with a view to achieving some level of compatibility as to the need for 
a satisfactory level of international regulatory linkage to prevent global 
systemic issues. In looking at financial regulatory structure, the emphasis is 
therefore on appropriately structured regulators and supervisors – regardless 
of the overall structure implemented in a given context.52
C. International Structures and Systems
Prior to the current global financial crisis, the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates (Joint Forum), comprising the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
bank, insurance and securities supervisors from thirteen countries53 and the 
51 See Arner, n 14 above; Arner & Lin, n 47 above.
52 U. Das, M. Quintyn & K. Chenard, “Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System 
Stability? An Empirical Analysis”, (2004) IMF Working Paper WP/04/89, p 1.
53 Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, United States.
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EU Commission participating as an observer, was established in early 1996 
to take forward the work of the prior Tripartite Group, whose report was re-
leased in July 1995. 
Prior to the current global financial crisis, the Joint Forum had devel-
oped the following principles, which formed a compendium54: Capital 
Adequacy Principles, Fit and Proper Principles, Framework for Supervi-
sory Information Sharing, Principles for Supervisory Information Sharing, 
Coordinator Guidance, Risk Concentrations Principles and Intra-group 
Transactions and Exposures Principles. To date, the FSF framework does not 
include a key standard addressing regulation and supervision of financial 
conglomerates; however, the FSF’s own Compendium does include a number 
of other standards in this area. These are grouped under two subheadings: (1) 
general supervision and (2) risk management. General supervision includes 
one standard,55 while risk management addresses intra-group transactions 
and exposures56 and risk concentration.57
As can be seen, this framework has proven insufficient at an interna-
tional level to address issues arising in the context of the global financial 
crisis. As noted above, the G20 has now begun to focus on these issues. 
In relation to regulatory regimes, for immediate action, the IMF, FSF and 
regulators are directed to “develop recommendations to mitigate pro-
cyclicality”, including in the context of valuation, leverage, bank capital, 
executive compensation, and provisioning.58 In addition, the G20 Action 
Plan addresses four medium-term actions. The first is a commitment by 
countries and regions to “review and report on the structure and principles 
of its regulatory system to ensure it is compatible with a modern and in-
creasingly globalised financial system”.59 In this context, all members of the 
G20 specifically commit to undertaking a Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gramme (FSAP) review.60 
The second is a direction to regulators and international standard-setters 
to conduct two reviews, the first of “the differentiated nature of regulation 
in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors” and the second of “the 
scope of financial regulation, with a special emphasis on institutions, instru-
ments, markets that are currently unregulated, along with ensuring that 
all systemically-important institutions are appropriately regulated”.61 This 
54 Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates (“Joint Forum”), Supervision of Financial Conglomerates 
(Feb 1999 as updated)
55 Ibid.
56 Joint Forum, Intra-Group Transactions and Exposure Principles (Dec 1999).
57 Joint Forum, Risk Concentration Principles (Dec 1999).
58 G20 Action Plan, p 2.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. It is interesting to note that even the United States has agreed to submit to an FSAP.
61 Ibid.
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point is key: regulation will be reviewed to address “regulatory arbitrage” 
and to cover existing gaps between regulators and jurisdictions.
The third is a direction to address resolution and insolvency regimes in 
order to ensure that they “permit an orderly wind-down of large complex 
cross-border financial institutions”.62 Once again, this is an issue which has 
been recognised for some years but which has been too complicated and 
politically sensitive to address. While in no way simple, this is the starting 
point for addressing a central weakness in the current legal framework for 
global finance. We return to this issue in Section IV.
As a related matter, under the fourth principle, the G20 committed to 
formulate national regulations in a “consistent manner”.63 In this respect, 
the G20 highlighted two aspects: (1) enhancement of cooperation and 
coordination “across all segments of financial markets, including … cross-
border capital flows”; and (2) as a matter of priority, the need to strengthen 
crisis prevention, management and resolution.64 The two immediate actions 
are significant. Under the first, supervisors are directed to “establish supervi-
sory colleges for all major cross-border financial institutions… Major global 
banks should meet regularly with their supervisory college for comprehen-
sive discussions of the firm’s activities and assessment of the risks it faces.”65 
Under the second, “[r]egulators should take all steps necessary to strengthen 
cross-border crisis management arrangements, including on cooperation 
and communication with each other and with appropriate authorities, and 
develop comprehensive contact lists and conduct simulation exercises as 
appropriate.”66 We return to this final point in Section IV.
The G20 Action Plan thus provides the launching point and a pre-
liminary context for addressing issues relating to the development of a 
framework for addressing the failure of LCGFIs. Applying this framework 
at the international level leads to four conclusions necessary to address 
prevention of the failure of international financial conglomerates. First, 
there is a clear need for redesign of key international regulatory criteria 
addressing capital and liquidity and the related need to develop a simple 
mechanism to address leverage. Second, transparency of global institutions 
will need to be enhanced, both domestically and internationally, through a 
central focus on accounting standards, off-shore jurisdictions and unregu-
lated portions of the financial system. Overall, no portion of a complex 
global financial conglomerate should be hidden in shadows, from regulators 
or from market participants. Third, there needs to be arrangements for the 
62 Ibid.
63 G20 Declaration, p 3.
64 Ibid.
65 G20 Action Plan, p 4.
66 Ibid.
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regulators of individual pieces of any complex global financial institution 
to work together, meeting frequently in order to ensure a complete under-
standing of the structure, business and risks of the firm. Fourth, as discussed 
in the preceding section, individual jurisdictions will need to carefully 
analyse the structure of financial firms and the structures of their regulatory 
systems in order to ensure that no gaps exist. Fifth, in addition to regulatory 
arrangements for individual firms, there should be strengthened monitor-
ing mechanisms for financial regulators and regulatory systems themselves, 
based on a strengthened FSF and/or use of “colleges” of regulators/supervi-
sors – an issue beyond the scope of the present article.
IV. Dealing with the Failure of Financial Conglomerates
Beyond preventing failures, however, it is also necessary to have ar-
rangements to address failures which do occur. In this context, effective 
insolvency provisions, including for financial institutions, are required to 
enable the redirection of capital and the closure of inefficient enterprises, 
hence improving governance and performance.67 Experiences in the current 
global financial crisis have underlined the significance of effective resolu-
tion and insolvency arrangements for not only banks but also financial 
conglomerates, especially those with global operations. As noted above, the 
G20 in November identified issues surrounding financial conglomerates for 
regulatory attention. At the same time, it also identified the clear need for 
mechanisms to address failures of such institutions when they occur, includ-
ing insolvency arrangements.
A. Failure versus insolvency
As discussed in the previous section, some jurisdictions will take the poli-
cy decision that major financial institutions are not allowed to fail. At the 
same time, even if such institutions are not to be subject to insolvency, as 
demonstrated by problems with Credit Lyonnais in France and with the 
major banks in China in the 1990s, jurisdictions need to have in place 
arrangements to address issues that may in fact arise despite their best ef-
forts to prevent them from doing so. As a result, such jurisdictions, even 
if excluding the possibility of insolvency of major financial institutions, 
should develop adequate systems to address other aspects of failure short 
of liquidation.
67 See Asian Development Bank, Law and Development at the Asian Development Bank (Apr 
1999), pp 7–36. 
09_Essays.indd   113 5/16/09   9:41:31 AM
114 Douglas W. Arner &  Joseph J. Norton (2009) HKLJ
In jurisdictions in which insolvency and liquidation will remain the 
ultimate sanction for failure in a market-based financial system, there is a 
clear necessity to have in place arrangements to deal with such failures in 
advance in order to avoid systemic financial problems. At the same time, 
assuming that international financial conglomerates will continue to exist 
and will continue to fail periodically, then there is also a clear necessity to 
put in place arrangements in advance to deal with such circumstances when 
they arise while minimising systemic risk.
B.  Domestic structures and systems
In looking at domestic systems, banks as the traditional source of systemic 
risk are the starting point. This is also the area in which the most expe-
rience has been accumulated and best practices most well understood, 
and these are being developed and expressed in the context of the World 
Bank – IMF Global Bank Insolvency Initiative.68 At the same time, bank 
insolvency differs in a number of ways from insolvency of non-banks. In ad-
dition, while banks have been viewed as the traditional source of systemic 
risk, it is now abundantly clear that banks are not the only source of sys-
temic risk and that arrangements must be in place to address insolvencies of 
all forms of financial institution, whether or not financial conglomerates are 
allowed to exist.
1. Corporate insolvency
A functioning legal framework for corporate insolvency management is 
crucial for the operation of a modern market-based economy. There can be 
no well-functioning corporate sector as a whole without effective mecha-
nisms which govern the exit of insolvent market participants from trading. 
Likewise, the financial sector will not engage in lending activities on a large 
scale if lenders do not have certainty regarding their position as secured 
creditors in the context the liquidation of their borrowers and that suffi-
cient means for the enforcement of security will be available. According to 
the Group of Ten, the general objectives of a system of corporate insolvency 
are reduction of uncertainty, promotion of efficiency, and fair and equitable 
treatment.69 A functioning insolvency regime thus helps reduce the risk of 
lending and the cost of debt service, and thereby increases the availability 
of credit and the making of investments generally.70 
68　 See IMF & World Bank, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional and Regulatory Environment for 
Bank Insolvency (Apr 2009).
69 Group of Ten (G10), Report of the Contact Group on the Legal and Institutional Underpinnings 
of the International Financial System (Dec 2002).
70 IMF Legal Department, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues (Washington DC: In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 1999), s 2; C. Averch, “Bankruptcy Laws: What is Fair?”, (2000) Law 
in Transition 26.
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Further, a properly administered insolvency system operates as a 
valuable instrument for the promotion of market discipline. Overall, 
an insolvency system serves as a means to ensure “the allocation of risk 
among participants in a market economy in a predictable, equitable, and 
transparent manner”.71 A functioning insolvency system, therefore, is 
at the core of the legal and institutional environment for finance in any 
market-based economy. 
A number of international organisations and associations have become 
involved with the development of standards for modern insolvency law 
and related systems. Many of these activities have focused on the develop-
ment of standards for cross-border insolvency cases in particular, such as the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency72 and, in the European Union, the 
Insolvency Regulation of 2000.73 More recently, a working group chaired by 
the Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented 
a document containing very detailed principles for the development of 
workable, modern insolvency legislation.74
At present, there is no internationally agreed key standard in the area 
of insolvency. However, the World Bank is co-ordinating an effort to de-
velop an agreed standard and is working with UNCITRAL to develop a 
framework for implementation. In this respect, in April 2001, the Board 
of the World Bank approved a first set of Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems.75 A revised set of the Prin-
ciples, taking into account further feedback and lessons from insolvency 
assessments conducted under the Reports on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC) initiative, is under development. The Bank is also 
working on a technical paper containing more detailed implementation 
guidelines to complement the Principles. In addition, building upon the 
work done by other international institutions (including the World Bank, 
IMF and Asian Development Bank (ADB)), UNCITRAL is currently 
finalising a legislative guide for insolvency – a combination of model 
provisions, recommendations and explanatory notes, which is currently 
71 IMF Legal Department, n 70 above.
72 See Ibid. Cf G. Johnson, “Towards International Standards on Insolvency: The Catalytic Role of 
the World Bank”, (2000) Law in Transition 69.
73 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, OJ L 160, 
30/06/2000, pp 1–13.
74 IMF Legal Department, n 70 above.
75 World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (Apr 
2001). The Principles were prepared by World Bank staff in collaboration with the African Devel-
opment Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Inter-American Development Bank, International Finance Corporation, IMF, Organisation of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, UNCITRAL, INSOL International and International Bar 
Association.
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set for release, along with a revised version of the World Bank Principles, 
sometime in the future.76 
Unfortunately, until the revised World Bank Principles and the final 
UNCITRAL Guide are integrated, approved and released, it is impossible 
to identify exactly the international consensus in this area. Thus, not only 
is guidance lacking in the context of financial institutions, to some extent, 
consensus is lacking in respect of general corporate insolvency. 
2. Bank insolvency and the GBII
Current international standards addressing banking supervision do not 
adequately provide appropriate safety net and exit arrangements, perhaps 
under the view that these are not strictly covered by “supervision”.77 The 
high cost to society of a collapse of the banking system is a principal reason 
why authorities in most developed countries provide some sort of a safety 
net for depositors, usually in the form of deposit insurance.78 While the 
intention is usually to minimise potential losses of public funds, the reality 
is that in the context of apparent or actual systemic instability, more often 
than not, governments around the world have supported not only healthy 
individual banks in the context of circumstances of potential or actual sys-
temic risk but also often unhealthy banks, whether systemically significant 
or not. Such arrangements (or the general belief in de facto government 
guarantees) inevitably create moral hazard because they hold open the pros-
pect that stakeholders will be at least partially indemnified from losses from 
failing intermediaries.
Historically, banking regulation developed as a response to crises result-
ing from the nature of banking business as a fractional reserve system based 
upon the management of credit and duration risks – a system that works 
wonderfully so long as depositors remain confident in the safety of their 
money with individual banks. The risk, of course, is that the collapse of one 
bank could lead to contagious loss of confidence, resulting in bank runs, 
potentially causing the collapse not only of individual banks, but also of the 
banking system as a whole (systemic risk) and the consequent collapse of 
economic activity generally.79 This risk, today, is considerably expanded and 
exacerbated as bank, capital and other financial markets and intermediaries 
have become increasingly interconnected to form a much broader financial 
system than had ever previously existed.
76 See UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of its Thirtieth Ses-
sion” (New York, 29 Mar–2 Apr 2004), A/CN.9/551 (United Nations, 30 Apr 2004), pp 3–7.
77 Thanks to Michael Taylor for this explanation.
78 See Arner, n 14 above.
79 See R. Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Supervision (London: Financial Markets Group, 1996).
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The response to this classic, and very real, problem was the development 
of the theory of the need for a “lender of last resort” by Henry Thornton in 
1802 and Walter Bagehot in 1873.80 The lender of last resort would provide 
liquidity support in order to allow solvent banks with good collateral to 
meet depositors’ demands and avoid closure, thereby supporting confidence 
and stemming potential systemic collapse. The problem, of course, is the 
equally classic theory of “moral hazard”. Specifically, in this context, moral 
hazard has two components: first, potential incentives to management to 
take additional (perhaps excessive) risks due to the promise of a govern-
ment bailout; and second, the consequent risk to the public purse due to 
the potential expense. Ideally, the second should not exist, but as noted 
earlier, more often than not, authorities become over-active in their sup-
port measures, shifting from pure liquidity support (which should not entail 
public expenses) to more general solvency support (which can entail very 
high public expense).
The response to this problem has been the development of what may 
be termed the traditional process of bank regulation and supervision. Un-
der this formulation, the goal of the traditional regulatory and supervisory 
process is simple on its face: the prevention and resolution of financial in-
termediary crises. Unfortunately, while the goal is simple, its achievement is 
anything but; and, today, though bank and non-bank financial institutions 
are increasingly interconnected, the regulatory approach and policies for 
non-bank financial institutions vary considerably. Nonetheless, it is worth 
reviewing the contents of the traditional formulation for preventing and 
resolving bank crises. At its most basic, the formulation involves two sets of 
processes: one ex ante, the other ex post crisis.
The ex ante measures focus on two related goals: first, supporting sound 
management and internal controls (a well-managed bank is less likely to 
be the subject either of a crisis or of contagion); and second, regulation 
and supervision (bank management, and arguably public authorities, have 
short memories and need to be given rules to follow; bank management also 
needs to be monitored to make sure that it, in fact, follows the rules). Sty-
listic issues, of course, relate to the administrative process and rule versus 
discretion-based approaches (eg, prompt corrective action). Of course, once 
again, while both appear relatively simple on their face, only recently have 
we begun to arrive at agreed formulations of their content.81
80 H. Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (London: J. 
Hatchard, 1802); W. Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873 [New York: 
John Wiley, 1999]).
81 See generally J. Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards (London: Kluwer, 1995). 
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The ex post measures focus on bolstering confidence, stemming conta-
gion and resolving problem intermediaries. Immediate measures focus on 
suspension of deposit redemption (never popular), the provision of support 
through the lender of last resort mechanism (to deal with illiquidity) and 
various mechanisms for depositor protection, of which deposit insurance is 
the most significant (to address insolvency). In addition to the immediate 
measures, other ex post measures are required to deal with the insolvency 
of individual institutions. In respect to individual institution insolven-
cies, four main mechanisms exist: (1) organisation of a rescue package, (2) 
provision of open financial assistance, (3) merger or acquisition (public or 
private) and (4) liquidation and pay-off. Finally, in some cases, measures 
will be required to address systemic insolvency (which is a very different 
sort of problem from “ordinary” bank failures), but these are rarely (if ever) 
organised in advance of such an actuality.82
3. Depositor protection schemes
Turning now to the next mechanism of immediate crisis resolution: the 
idea is that some sort of depositor protection scheme can be put in place to 
support confidence in times of crisis and also to assist in the resolution of 
normal bank failures. Note that while explicit deposit insurance protects 
mainly depositors, the lender of last resort function protects mainly the fi-
nancial system (systemic considerations).83 
As the starting point, any form of depositor protection can either be 
implicit or explicit. In addition, it is clearly possible for any jurisdiction to 
have no such system in place at all; while some suggest that no system is, 
in fact, an implicit government guarantee, it is possible (though certainly 
not politically easy) not to provide government support at all and on occa-
sion governments have managed to stand aside. In most cases, however, no 
deposit insurance system does, in fact, imply an implicit government guar-
antee, at least for depositors of the largest financial institutions. 
Explicit systems typically take one of two forms: (1) an explicit blan-
ket guarantee of all deposits or (2) an explicit, limited-coverage system 
of deposit insurance. Explicit deposit insurance, that is, the creation of a 
deposit guarantee scheme by law, with rules with regard to the extent of 
the “insurance” or protection, the rules of the scheme and the type of de-
posits / depositors protected can be a useful instrument of protective bank 
regulation. Indeed, explicit deposit insurance has traditionally served two 
purposes: consumer protection and the prevention of bank runs. A third 
82 For discussion, see D. Hoelscher & M. Quintyn, et al, “Managing Systemic Banking Crises”, (1993) 
IMF Occasional Paper No 224.
83 This point also underlines that deposit insurance should only be triggered when a bank is declared 
insolvent.
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rationale of explicit deposit insurance is that it allows the public authorities 
to close banks more easily, as it becomes politically acceptable to liquidate 
insolvent institutions, in the knowledge that unsophisticated depositors are 
protected.
Under an explicit deposit guarantee scheme, depositors are only paid 
once the bank is closed and, in many cases, liquidated (though there is, in 
fact, a strong argument that payment should be made as soon as possible 
after closure rather than held for liquidation, resolution, etc – a problem 
that arose directly in the context of the failure of Northern Rock in the 
United Kingdom in 2007). Thus, there can be no deposit insurance if the 
bank remains open. Therefore, explicit deposit insurance presupposes that 
a bank has failed and, hence, it is not compatible with the “too big to fail” 
doctrine.
Implicit deposit insurance, as opposed to explicit deposit insurance, is 
potentially a “blanket guarantee” for all sorts of depositors (insured and un-
insured), other creditors, shareholders and even managers – as it is implicit, 
the exact meaning can only be inferred from previous behaviour. Implicit 
deposit insurance often presupposes that the bank remains in business (either 
because it is too big to fail or because it is politically difficult to close the 
bank), thus creating pervasive moral hazard incentives. While explicit de-
posit insurance is applied ex post (following the closure of a bank), implicit 
deposit insurance is often applied while a bank is still in operation. 
Explicit deposit insurance is intended to inflict only limited, if any, dam-
age upon taxpayers, and, depending on the funding of the scheme, there 
may be no damage at all, though this is certainly not always achieved in 
practice. However, implicit deposit insurance has the potential of shifting 
the burden onto taxpayers (at least indirectly), since rescue packages tend 
to be financed by the government. The use of rescue packages not only 
results in moral hazard considerations, but may also affect competition, es-
pecially if a too big to fail doctrine is applied.
An explicit blanket guarantee can take either a formal legal form or 
simply be a government pronouncement or policy. Either will likely be suffi-
ciently clear and robust for purposes of confidence; the difficulty arises if the 
government decides to eliminate the guarantee and move to an explicit, 
limited-coverage system of deposit insurance. The central issue is the cred-
ibility of the guarantee: Is the government able to mobilise sufficient fiscal 
resources and political commitment to make good the guarantee?
Explicit deposit insurance is a guarantee limited to one type of “preferred 
creditors”, that is, insured depositors. Under explicit deposit insurance, 
uninsured depositors, other creditors, shareholders and managers are not 
protected. Therefore, explicit deposit insurance is more compatible with 
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market discipline, as uninsured depositors and other creditors have an inter-
est in monitoring the solvency of the bank while still in operation.
In September 2001, the FSF endorsed the report of its Working Group 
on Deposit Insurance as international guidance for jurisdictions consider-
ing the adoption of an explicit, limited-coverage deposit insurance system.84 
Recognising that existing guidance was insufficient, in March 2008, the 
Basel Committee and the International Association of Deposit Insurers 
(IADI, established in May 2002) released for consultation an extensively 
revised set of principles for deposit insurance.85 The document, comprising 
18 principles in 10 groups, addresses: setting objectives (principles 1-2), 
mandates and powers (principles 3-4), governance (principle 5), relation-
ships with other safety-net participants and cross-border issues (principles 
6-7), membership and coverage (principles 8-10), funding (principle 11), 
public awareness (principle 12), selected legal issues (principles 13-14), fail-
ure resolution (principles 15-16) and reimbursing depositors and recoveries 
(principles 17-18).
While this document is a significant development, especially in terms 
of specificity, it nonetheless does not address in any comprehensive either 
actual insolvency resolution or cross-border issues.
 4. Bank insolvency
Beyond immediate measures to deal with banking crises (such as the lender 
of last resort function), some system needs to be in place to deal with 
individual situations of bank insolvency. Clearly, however, no system is nec-
essary in jurisdictions which do not intend to allow any banks to become 
insolvent. 
Generally speaking, the goals of bank insolvency are threefold: (1) fair 
treatment of all creditors, (2) maximisation of the value of the estate and 
(3) reduction of systemic risk – with all three goals potentially in conflict.86 
Typically, however, the various functions concerned are often embedded in 
different institutions.87 The primary authorities and their functions can be 
categorised as: (1) insolvency authorities, (2) supervisory authorities, (3) 
lender of last resort, (4) monetary policy authorities, (5) deposit insurance 
authorities and (6) criminal authorities.88 
84 FSF, Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Sept 2001). 
85 Basel Committee & IADI, Consultative Document: Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insur-
ance Systems (Mar 2009).
86 “Bank insolvencies entail systemic risks which are absent in the bankruptcy of most commercial 
concerns.” E. Patrikis, “Role and Functions of Authorities: Supervision, Insolvency Prevention and 
Liquidation”, in M. Giovanoli & G. Heinrich (eds), International Bank Insolvencies: A Central Bank 
Perspective (London: Kluwer, 1999), p 283.
87 Ibid, p 284.
88 Cf Ibid, pp 284–5.
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In this context, the World Bank/IMF Global Bank Insolvency Initiative 
(GBII) has developed a framework addressing five main elements: (1) legal 
and institutional framework; (2) official administration of banks; (3) bank 
restructuring; (4) bank liquidation; and (5) application of the principles in 
systemic crises.89
As noted earlier, the availability of the traditional methods very much 
depends upon the individual legal system. The organisation of a rescue 
package typically will not require specific authorisation. On the other hand, 
the ability to provide open assistance may be clearly constrained by law. 
The availability of merger or acquisition, whether public or private, like-
wise varies, with some jurisdictions having specific legislation addressing 
financial intermediary mergers / acquisitions, while in others, (especially 
common law jurisdictions) such issues are primarily dealt with through 
the relevant company law. In most cases, however, issues will arise under 
banking law / regulation concerning licenses / authorisation. Finally, the 
availability of liquidation and pay-off varies greatly, with some jurisdictions 
having completely separate stand-alone systems for bank insolvencies (eg 
United States), while in others, bank insolvencies are largely dealt with 
through the general system of corporate insolvency, although typically 
modified in some way by banking law / regulation (eg United Kingdom). 
The greater concern is typically in the latter sorts of jurisdictions where in-
solvency law and systems may not always be overly effective. Significantly, 
an ineffective system of insolvency may also be a barrier to effective out-of-
court workouts.
Beyond individual bank insolvencies, measures to address systemic in-
solvency are typically only developed in the context of an actual situation. 
Unfortunately, not only can weakness in the overall design of the financial 
safety net potentially lead to such problems, but weaknesses in supporting 
legal infrastructure can also make resolution more difficult.
5. Insolvencies of non-bank financial institutions and financial conglomerates
In addressing the failure of a systemically important financial conglom-
erate, the first order concern is a robust financial infrastructure. In this 
context, international and domestic efforts under G20 direction are 
underway in respect of financial infrastructure, especially clearing and 
settlement arrangements for OTC derivatives. The second concern relates 
to financial institution safety and soundness. In this context, likewise, ar-
rangements for corporate governance and risk management and related 
prudential regulatory and supervisory arrangements are also in progress 
under G20 leadership; however, these are beyond the scope of the present 
89 See IMF & World Bank, n 68 above.
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article. The third concern relates to contingency arrangements to deal 
with problem financial institutions, namely liquidity arrangements, mech-
anisms for resolving problem institutions and related consumer protection 
mechanisms.
In relation to such arrangements, the first issue relates to financial in-
stitution failure: it now seems likely that certain jurisdictions may simply 
decide that major financial institutions will not be allowed to fail. In such 
jurisdictions, the focus must of necessity be on the first and second order 
concerns of infrastructure, management and supervision in order to ensure 
that no failure does in fact take place. At the same time, perhaps in the 
majority of jurisdictions, financial institutions including major systemically 
important financial institutions will face the possibility of failure as the 
ultimate market sanction. In such jurisdictions, the first order concern will 
be to minimise the frequency of such events through infrastructure, gover-
nance and regulation. At the same time, contingency arrangements must 
be put in place prior to the emergence of any significant failure in order to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the events of the current global financial crisis.
In respect to contingency arrangements, assuming due attention to ex 
ante mechanisms, the concern is ex post concerns. In this context, one can 
divide circumstances into a variety of contexts: liquidity; insolvency in nor-
mal circumstances; and systemic insolvency. 
In the case of liquidity, the traditional principles of the lender of last 
resort should be extended to all systemically significant financial institu-
tions rather than just to banks. At the same time, the traditional rules in 
light of the global financial crisis require certain modification. Specifical-
ly, a liquidity provider of last resort must be available to provide liquidity 
under the following conditions: (1) to any financial institution which is 
temporarily illiquid but solvent (a determination which must take place 
on the basis of adequate supervisory arrangements); (2) freely but with 
penalty interest (in order to discourage replacement of money markets 
by the central bank); (3) to any financial institution with good collateral 
(which must be applied broadly and not just to cash and government 
securities, requiring advance planning on the part of the liquidity pro-
vider); (4) the liquidity provider must make its readiness to lend and its 
terms and conditions clear ex ante; (5) the liquidity provision however 
remains discretionary; and (6) that discretion should be on the basis of 
potential systemic risk, such risk however should not be analysed solely 
on the basis of the individual financial institution but rather on the basis 
of the financial system as a whole. Such mechanisms should be backed by 
clear consumer protection arrangements in order to maintain public con-
fidence. These are discussed in more detail below.
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In the context of insolvency under normal circumstances, generally 
speaking this implies the necessity of the following arrangements: (1) in-
solvency of a single non-systemic financial institution; (2) insolvency of a 
single systemically significant financial institution; and (3) insolvency of 
multiple non-systemic financial institutions. In each of these cases, arrange-
ments should include: (1) a liquidity provider along the lines discussed 
above for solvent financial institutions; (2) intervention mechanisms for in-
solvency financial institutions; and (3) consumer protection arrangements 
to maintain confidence in solvent institutions and to enable rapid predict-
able compensation for customers of insolvent institutions. In addition to 
liquidity, intervention and consumer protection arrangements, jurisdictions 
should also have in place arrangements to resolve insolvent institutions, 
through merger or sale of assets, public assistance where necessary on clear 
terms and closure / liquidation arrangements.
In the more complex situations – systemic financial crises typically in-
volving multiple systemic and non-systemic financial institutions – the 
general mechanisms available are clear (and becoming more so as a result 
of ongoing efforts to resolve the current crisis). At the same time, while 
contingency planning is necessary, putting in place actual arrangements 
ex ante is problematic, given that each crisis and context is very different. 
Nonetheless, the major tools required initially are the same as for normal 
circumstances, namely: liquidity, merger / sale, public assistance, closure / 
liquidation, and consumer protection. The existence of a properly designed 
system covering all systemically significant financial institutions will im-
prove performance in the context of a systemic crisis. At the same time, 
certain mechanisms will also probably be necessary in a systemic crisis, 
including: arrangements for regulatory forebearance; mechanisms to guar-
antee consumers; mechanisms to recapitalise and/or nationalise systemically 
significant insolvent financial institutions; corporate and economic support 
and/or restructuring mechanisms in order to resolve underlying problems or 
maintain the economy while the financial system is addressed; and mecha-
nisms to address problem assets and institutions. In respect of the latter, 
these may include government support as well as private restructuring / 
resolution, good bank – bad bank or asset management company arrange-
ments, and central agencies.
C. International arrangements
While domestic arrangements, at least for banks, are well understood, inter-
national arrangements for banks, non-banks and financial conglomerates at 
the international level are generally non-existent. Although certain efforts 
have been made to address cross-border insolvency generally (an area in 
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which Philip was a leading light), these are of much less use in the context 
of complex cross-border financial institution insolvencies.
With that discussion of the requirements at the domestic level, it be-
comes possible to consider possible international arrangements. At the first 
level, there is a clear need for internationally agreed standards outlining 
the content of domestic systems, as has been done for regulation and as is 
being modified as a result of the current crisis. In this context, the IMF-
World Bank Global Bank Insolvency Initiative could be expanded beyond 
banks to address financial insolvencies generally, with the objective of de-
veloping guidance on resolving financial institution insolvencies. As with 
the existing initiative, this would provide important detail in the context 
of the Basel, IOSCO and IAIS principles, especially if these (as a result of 
G20 initiatives) are brought into closer alignment. At the same time, as is 
the context of the existing initiative, the focus is probably best placed on 
domestic arrangements. 
In the context of problems in a global financial institution, assuming a 
move to an arrangement based on supervisory colleges coordinated through 
the FSF, it would seem appropriate to require members of the organisation 
to convene and notify other supervisory college members prior to activation 
of ex post measures, to allow coordinated intervention and resolution to the 
extent possible.
There is one caveat, however, that relates to regulatory arrangements: 
based on experiences with cross-border financial institution insolvencies 
and absent any international arrangement or agreement on addressing 
conflicts between individual jurisdictions, it appears highly advisable for in-
dividual jurisdictions to require all foreign financial institutions to operate 
via separately capitalised subsidiaries in order to minimise domestic damage 
resulting from any international insolvency. Such a requirement would sim-
ply mean that foreign financial institutions are treated exactly as domestic 
financial institutions.
V. Conclusion
As noted at the outset, preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fun-
damental aspect of financial regulatory design, with such design requiring 
the following elements to be addressed: (1) financial infrastructure; (2) 
corporate governance and risk management; (3) disclosure; (4) prudential 
regulation and supervision; (5) liquidity arrangements; (6) mechanisms for 
resolving problem institutions; and (7) consumer protection mechanisms.
In relation to LCGFIs, each of these aspects will need to be addressed at 
the domestic, international and in some cases regional levels. While Philip 
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would have been most interested in the issues arising in the context of 
actual insolvencies such as that of Lehman Brothers (and there are many, 
with new conflicts and problems arising on an almost weekly basis), he 
would also have appreciated the difficulties of applying traditional domestic 
insolvency mechanisms in the context of complex financial conglomerates 
such as AIG. In the final analysis, it is a great shame that the legal and aca-
demic worlds will suffer from the loss of Philip’s sharp analytical mind on 
the many issues arising from the current crisis. On a more personal level, we 
have certainly missed being able to discuss points such as those in this ar-
ticle – especially since under other circumstances, we would have preferred 
this piece to have had three authors rather than just two. 
At the same time, international attention has begun to focus to a 
greater extent on these issues than has ever previously been the case. In 
their April 2009 meetings, the G20 and FSF have addressed these issues, 
building upon previous agreements in most cases but in some cases going 
further, with the G20 leaders stating in their communiqué that “[m]ajor 
failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision 
were fundamental causes of the crisis”,90 and committing “to extend regu-
lation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, 
instruments and markets”.91
In support of these general principles, in an annex to the April Lon-
don communiqué, the G20, also established the outline of details of 
approaches going forward, with the FSF renamed and reconstituted as the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB)92 and tasked, inter alia, to “set guidelines 
for, and support the establishment, functioning of, and participation in, 
supervisory colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most 
systemically important cross-border firms” and to “support contingency 
planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to 
systemically important firms”,93 including “to support continued efforts by 
the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and BCBS to develop an international frame-
work for cross-border bank resolution arrangements”.94 At the same time, 
reflecting that such efforts are in reality in most cases still at an early 
90 G20, London Summit – Leaders’ Statement, London, United Kingdom, 2 Apr 2009, para 13, avail-
able at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_communique_020409.pdf (visited 16 Apr 2009).
91 Ibid, para 15.
92 FSF, “Financial Stability Forum re-established as the Financial Stability Board”, FSF Press Release 
14/2009, 2 Apr 2009. As part of the process, the FSB’s mandate was reconstituted to include, in-
ter alia, to “set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges” and “manage 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemically 
important firms.” Ibid, para 9.
93 G20, London Summit – Leaders’ Statement, Annex: Declaration on Strengthening the Financial 
System – London, United Kingdom, 2 Apr 2009, p 1, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf (visited 16 Apr 2009). 
94 Ibid, p 2.
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stage, the G20 recognised “the importance of further work and interna-
tional cooperation on the subject of exit strategies”.95
In respect of LCGFIs, the G20 confirmed that “large and complex finan-
cial institutions require particularly careful oversight given their systemic 
importance”,96 reflecting the conclusions of the conclusions of a supporting 
working group chaired by Canada and India.97 In this respect, the working 
group concluded in its Recommendation 7 that “[l]arge complex financial 
institutions require particularly robust oversight given their systemic im-
portance, which arises in part from their size and interconnectedness (or 
correlation) with other institutions, and from their influence on markets” 
with responsibility assigned to the FSB and prudential supervisors.98 
The working group also identified weaknesses in resolution procedures 
for financial institutions as a particular weakness in the context of the crisis: 
“Existing procedures for resolving troubled institutions have been shown 
to be inadequate when an institution imposes substantial systemic risks. In 
addition, national resolution mechanisms have not been effective in some 
cross-border resolutions.”99 However, the working group did not address re-
lated issues, leaving such issues to a second G20 working group.100
G20 working group 2, inter alia, recognised the problems posed especial-
ly in the cross-border context and supported on-going work “to develop an 
international framework for cross-border bank resolutions, and to address 
the issue of ring-fencing and financial burden-sharing”.101 In the absence of 
such arrangements, the working group advocated the development of re-
gional resolution systems in the medium term.
In addition, the FSF released the most significant attempt to date to 
address issues of failure resolution, the FSF Principles for Cross-border Co-
operation on Crisis Management.102 In this short document (three pages of 
actual text), the FSF stated “[t]he objective of financial crisis management 
is to seek to prevent serious domestic or international financial instability 
that would have an adverse impact on the real economy”.103 At the same 
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 G20, G20 Working Group 1 – Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency: Fi-
nal Report (Mar. 2009), p ii, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_wg1_010409.pdf (visit 
16 Apr 2009). 
98 Ibid, p xii.
99 Ibid, p v.
100 G20, G20 Working Group on Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting Integrity in 
Financial Markets (WG2): Final Report (Mar 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
g20_wg2_010409.pdf (visited 16 Apr 2009).  
101 Ibid, pp 5, 18–20.
102 FSF, FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management (Apr 2009); see also FSF, 
“Financial Stability Forum Issues Recommendations and Principles to Strengthen Financial Sys-
tems”, FSF Press Release 13/2009, 2 Apr 2009.
103 Ibid, para 1.
09_Essays.indd   126 5/16/09   9:41:38 AM
Vol 39 Part 1 Building a Framework to Address Failure of Complex Global Financial Institutions 127
time, the FSF recognised that such financial crisis management “remains a 
domestic competence”, albeit one requiring cross-border cooperation.104
In relation to preparation, authorities will “[d]evelop common support 
tools for managing a cross-border financial crisis, including: these princi-
ples; a key data list; a common language for assessing systemic implications 
(drawing on those developed by the European Union and by national 
authorities); a document that authorities can draw on when considering 
together the specific issues that may arise in handling severe stress at spe-
cific firms; and an experience library, which pools key lessons from different 
crises.”105 In addition, supervisors will meet at least annually through the 
college framework,106 share a range of information on LCGFIs,107 and ensure 
that firms have internal contingency plans in place.108
In managing financial crises, authorities will “[s]trive to find internation-
ally coordinated solutions that take account of the impact of the crisis on 
the financial systems and real economies of other countries, drawing on 
information, arrangements and plans developed ex-ante. These coordinated 
solutions will most likely be mainly driven by groups of authorities of the 
most directly involved countries.”109
In conclusion, it is clear that the systemic phase of the current global 
financial crisis was triggered by the failure of large complex global financial 
conglomerates. In this context, as recognised by the G20, one of the great-
est failures of both international and domestic legal and regulatory systems 
has been the lack of appropriate arrangements, including adequate insol-
vency arrangements, to address such failures when they occur. Following 
a discussion of the difficulties of dealing with the failure of large complex 
global financial conglomerates such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, the ar-
ticle advocated a framework based upon prevention of failure as the first 
element and mechanisms to address failure when they occur as the second. 
While the recent pronouncements from the G20 and FSF are a very 
useful start, especially in relation to regulation, supervision and contin-
gency planning for LCGFI failure, the statements, reports and principles 
to date while recognising the problems raised by LCGFI failure, largely 
leave actual resolution to domestic authorities, suggesting that in the final 
analysis individual jurisdictions will have to carefully consider their own 
arrangements respecting potential failure of any LCGFI operating within 
their jurisdiction and take appropriate precautionary actions ex ante. We 
104 Ibid, para 2.
105 Ibid, para 3.
106 Ibid, para 4.
107 Ibid, paras 5–6.
108 Ibid, paras 7–9.
109 Ibid, para 11.
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must therefore conclude, unfortunately, even in the midst of the current 
global financial crisis, that while it may be possible to develop adequate 
international arrangements relating to prevention of LCGFI failure, there 
is still insufficient consensus in respect of actual insolvency arrangements 
for any international framework to emerge at present. In such context, 
individual jurisdictions must therefore act proactively in building preven-
tive arrangements based on internationally agreed approaches as they 
are agreed. At the same time, given that probable continuing lack of 
arrangements to deal with actual insolvencies of LCGFIs at an interna-
tional level, individual jurisdictions should mandate separately capitalised 
subsidiaries subject to domestic insolvency arrangements for global firms 
appropriate for the activities being engaged in the individual jurisdiction, 
at present the only arrangement capable to some extent of limiting the 
damage in individual jurisdictions resulting from the failure of an LCGFI 
and one that has been adopted with some success in Hong Kong and is 
now being advocated by the United Kingdom not only for global institu-
tions but even for financial institutions operating in the context of the 
European Union’s single financial market.110
110 See Financial Services Agency, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Cri-
sis (Mar 2009).
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